

3-1973

March 1973

Valparaiso University

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
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the lighter march 1973 the lighter march 1973



The Lighter is a variety magazine from the students and faculty of Valparaiso University, funded by the Student Senate. We hope the Lighter will also serve to provoke serious discussion on our unique relationships to each other within the context of an intellectual Christian community and our personal and corporate responsibilities reaching beyond campus. Contributions are selected on the basis of quality and their appeal to the interests of all members of the University community. Entire contents copyrighted by Albert G. Huegel, President of Valparaiso University.

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Beep Beep Beep
Click Digit Digit Beep Crunch
Beep Beep Beep
Click Digit Crunch Clunk Clip Digit
Beep Digit Clip Digit Crunch
Gruch Voohp Click Digit Beep
Beep
Click Digit Beep Cruch
Digit
Cap Com
I am a man over and out

You are your gradepoint
Your average; your intelligence
Quota
Filled. But that's my soul across
The Berlin Wall
Sorry
The quota is filled.

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smog 70

Smog
Rides to town
In our little foreign import
Fornicates in the back allies
With the smut
Of city smokestacks
Leaving behind
A litter of problems for us
Then finds its way across
The sky!

You are your identification
Card.
Halt. But that's my mind you're
Checking.
Those are the laws
The government of Johanesburg has spoken

CURRENT DATE		PHONE	TYPE COLLEGE	CLASS
LOCAL CITY			LOCAL ST	LOCAL ZIP
CITIZENSHIP	HOME STATE	HOME COUNTY		
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L CURRICULUM		ADVISOR		
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FOR MEN AND MACHINES

Broken branch
Dancing in the wind
Just what of life
Have you been fortunate to view
But broken now
I wonder how you took it all
So long and lank
What prangster lobbed you
From your shank?
The joyous winter wind?
Or kin of some two legged kind?
Were you blind to their approach?
Or could you only cower
'Fore the might which shafted you?
Did it tower over your little frame
Call you by name
Before it did the evil deed?
Poor little branch
Dancing in the winter wind
What view of death
You offer me
Still clinging hopelessly onto
The tree from which you sprang
My dying dancing little branch

I think of you a lot; I speak your name
And on occasion I write you a letter
In my mind — I find to put it down
Is either difficult or dull
I cannot spell the things I'd like to say
There aren't enough words, or time to make them
So I forsake them. . .
And in the process, only in the process
I seem too, to forsake you

What always happens? Why must it happen?
People grow
Together and apart
It's not always because they want
And yet it seems to be always
Though we struggle to prolong
And very often, to avoid the obvious
We only think a lot; we speak a name
But don't dare communicate it
Unless the same should happen to
What we have
What we used to have
What we'd like to have again

I think of you; I speak of you
And yet I feel it happening
Despite my dry attempts
To make it all seem now
When it was yesterday
Why must it happen?
People know yesterday
And grow apart today.


I'm not going to say it again

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Beep Beep Beep
 Click Digit Digit Beep Cruch
 Grunch Digit Beep Beep
 Clip Digit Beep Beep
 Voohp Digit Digit Beep
 Beep Digit Digit Crunch
 Beep
 Digit

 Digit
 No — ROGER
 You are a machine

Cap Com
 Digit Digit Beep Voohp
 Ma Dot Digit Digit Crunch
 Beep
 You are the
M digit digit beep beep
A voohp digit digit grunch beep
C digit digit beep digit beep
H digit beep voohp cruch crunch
I am beep digit digit voohp beep
N beep beep crunch voohp digit
E digit digit crunch voohp beep
THE MAN
 Beep Digit Digit Digit CRUNCH
 AFTER ALL DIGIT DIGIT BOOM
 ah!



ONE OF THE EAGLES



WRO

THE LIGHT. it began with that flare. UNWOMANLY STRENGTH OF HEART. she wrote that she was the man of the house now. FOR THE WATCHMAN, BAD DREAMS. did the kids miss me? wasn't my pay enough? or worse? FEAR. everything gone to hell. A HOUSE IN DISORDER. how can she run things? WHAT WAS THE PREVIOUS REDEMPTION? a home needs a man. RAGE OF EAGLES, THE FLEDGLINGS DESTROYED. those gook brats, burning. LATE BUT CERTAIN IS THE GODS' REVENGE. not to my kids. REVENGE ON THE SEDUCER. almost ten years; if she has a lover...NO OFFERING WILL ASSUAGE THE ANGER OF THE GODS. it was for her: three a flier, seven a prisoner. MORE LIGHT. looking at the flare when we hit. SORROW AND HOPE, DARKNESS AND LIGHT. but I'm going home, the nightmare is over. TWIN EAGLES DEVOUR THE PREGNANT HARE. bad dreams still; strafing the hospital. RELIEVE OUR IGNORANCE! I'll never know if we did the right thing. THE CHILD OF TIME REBELS, BY FORCE HE WINS. we had to be strong, to fight for everything. YET THE TERRIBLE SACRIFICE, THE SAFFRON ROBES STIFFENING WITH BLOOD. you have to pay a price, nothing gets done unless you pay the price. YOKED TO THE DEED, HARNESSSED TO NECESSITY. I did my duty; what else. could I do? THIS DAWN, DAUGHTER OF THE DAWN,

BESETS OUR EYES. I can't believe it was all for nothing. DREAMS AND RUMORS, A MESSAGE OF FIRE. they say we are criminals, napalming children. WERE THE ALTARS SMASHED, THE HOUSE SHALL BURN. soldiers in the temple. and what was their religion anyway? monkey-gods. AWKWARD AS LOBSTERS IN THE NETS OF DISASTER, AWAITING THE KNIFE. so many times they could have killed us, thank God it's too late now. GRAVES DEEP IN THE ALIEN SOIL THEY HATED AND CONQUERED. but so many didn't make it; good men rotting in these stinking jungles. LET ME ATTAIN NO ENVIED WEALTH, LET ME NOT PLUNDER CITIES, NOR BE TAKEN IN TURN, AND FACE LIFE IN THE POWER OF ANOTHER. maybe it would have been better to die. A VOW TO TRAMPLE MANY SPLENDORS DOWN. if only we hadn't crashed; we could have gone on; we could have won; I've always wanted another chance. JUSTICE LEADS HIM IN A CRIMSON PATH. it'll be the red carpet when we get home, we will have honor. MUST HE GIVE BLOOD FOR GENERATIONS GONE, DIE FOR THOSE HE SLEW? the wife will be there. she at least will understand, will forgive. A DREAM THAT STUMBLES IN THE DAYLIGHT. they will all forgive, no one will hate me, no one will wish that I were dead. I KNOW BY HEART THE LEGEND OF ANCIENT WICKEDNESS WITHIN THIS HOUSE.

unbeginnings:

warm and violent touch


currents of shock and substance
this utter, liberate madness;
when precious and petulant patterns break down,

then take, take the smooth velvet sky
and ravish her, dazzle her wide with electric unendings —

dark touch discordantly rich
beneath whose weight words, those most suspect of gods,
dissemble no longer, no longer,

but shudder to silence; as sparks shock the senses,
as every thing temporal explodes out of time

into exquisite nowness:
as touching is all.



image




Ikeda



Karvellas

of man



AN INTERVIEW

By Kurt Kroenke

IS MAN a machine? Will scientists someday be able to control human behavior? Or does man have a free will, self-determination, the power of choice? Different schools of psychology hold markedly different views of man. To find out how some of our own psychologists at Valparaiso University feel, the editors asked Kurt Kroenke to interview Peter Karvellas and Matthew Ikeda, professors in the Department of Psychology. Dr. Karvellas, whose main interest lies in physiological psychology, distinguishes himself from the behaviorists in certain key areas. He does, however, merge with them on the issue of free will. Likewise, Professor Ikeda, whose main interest lies in developmental psychology and personality studies, though technically not a humanistic nor an existential psychologist, finds their view of man more acceptable than the mechanistic view put forth by behaviorists.

As a psychologist, what view do you hold of man?

K: It is my view that man's behavior is ultimately reducible to physical terms. As a physiological psychologist, I work under the fundamental assumption that there exists for every psychological event a corresponding brain state. Thus, under this view, it would seem to follow that to understand man, to understand the vast array of psychological behaviors he is capable of exhibiting, one should look at the neural correlates of these behaviors. Once these brain-behavior correlations have been identified it should then be possible to manipulate psychological experience and behavior by directly manipulating the neural substrates from which they emanate.

I: I find that question very difficult to answer because you're asking my view as a psychologist. I have to distinguish myself as a psychologist and as a human being. As a psychologist I view man in developmental terms, as an organism that grows from infancy through an entire life cycle. This concept of a growing organism, cognitively, emotionally, and socially, from early stage to final stage, is my psychological view. As a human being I look at man in a deeper sense than as a psychologist.

Are you implying that psychology just deals with a certain part of man, that it doesn't concern itself with the whole man?

I: At this point, psychologists are not quite capable of dealing with ontological-existential questions: man's fear of death, finding meaning and purpose in life, the possibility of meaninglessness and emptiness in life, and so forth. Many psychologists are beginning to show interest in these areas, but such interest is still in its infancy. Eventually, an adequate view of man, even from a psychological viewpoint, must be kind of a holistic one, the result of a dialogue between psychology and other disciplines, including the humanities.

Does man exert any control over his development, or is growth purely a function of genetic and environmental factors as the behaviorists contend? In other words, does man have a free will?

K: I'm not really a behaviorist. I think of a behaviorist as one who just simply seeks to identify in a descriptive way the relationship between stimuli and responses without regard to intervening processes, without regard to the effects the stimuli have on the organization of the human nervous system. I'm willing as a physiological psychologist to talk about some things behaviorists are not willing to talk about. I'm willing to talk about love, I'm willing to talk about compassion, I'm willing to talk about a number of so-called human value kinds of mental states. But I share with the behaviorists the view that man's behavior is strictly determined, that man does not make choices, that deliberation is an illusion, that what man therefore does is inevitable, that man is not blameable nor praiseworthy for what he does, that his behavior is simply a consequence of genetic and environmental input.

I: There are a great deal of determinants in a human life. We have many givens, but within those broad determinants of human behavior, the empirical facts point to the fact that the more mature an organism, the greater its degrees of freedom. The human being is an open system, a creative being. Within the givens of internal/external determinants, man has a great degree of freedom to actualize



himself. It is a well-known developmental fact that as a man grows from a child to an adolescent, and then to an adult, he has an increasing awareness of his own choices and a sense of responsibility for what he chooses. To that extent, man has a certain degree of self-determination.

The word "autonomous" is interesting because Skinner* talks about the autonomous man as myth. What is your response to the concept of an autonomous man?

I: Empirically speaking, I refer man's autonomous behavior to the choice behavior we exhibit. We have various choices we can make in life. For instance, when you come to a university you have a choice of whether you want to be a psychology major or a biology major or some other major. Skinner's own daughter **chose**, after severe identity crises, to become an artist, not a behaviorist. That choice behavior I'm referring to as the free element, the ego function, in man.

K: By simply saying he chose or she chose does not mean he or she chose. . . . Behavior may appear to be choice on the surface, yet on further analysis it can be discerned perhaps that the behavior would follow; it's inevitable given certain historical facts and certain genetic facts about that person that he would have responded in that particular way. . . . I subscribe to a deterministic point of view — I don't say it is true, for it hasn't been proven nor do I think it ever will — simply on a pragmatic basis. It works, and I find I'm able to study human behavior using the scientific model which is deterministic. And if you compare the power of this method with any other — yours perhaps — you'll have to agree it's a very powerful method indeed, one that has produced and continues to produce a steady, high-quality collection of knowledge about man and about the world. I acknowledge the fact that science may at the present be unable to offer a satisfactory explanation of those cognitive psychological phenomena which are of principal concern to your humanistic orientation; however, I believe that these phenomena are ultimately amenable to scientific analysis and therefore will someday be explained. To push the panic button at this point and introduce a free will postulate is, I feel, a bit premature.

I: I'm not pressing the panic button. I feel that at this stage of the game some degree of agnosticism may be far preferable to a deterministic postulate. We may not know all about human behavior. It is my belief that within certain determinants of behavior — environmental and genetic givens — growth of the organism suggests certain degrees of freedom, self-determination, and responsibility for his life. I do not excuse every irresponsible action with the determinist notion of antecedents. I think a man has a

responsibility for his life, and he's aware of his own quality of life. The issue of morality and ethics becomes a very serious problem if determinism becomes a world view. Now, a world view is not supposed to be within the domain of science; a world view is a philosophical enterprise. If you are willing to say that, not as a scientist, but as a philosopher, you hold to the world view of a deterministic universe, that's one thing. But in saying science dictates determinism you have committed a naturalistic fallacy. Naturalism is simply a description of the facts. If gathering the facts as they exist suggests deterministic lawfulness and you tentatively hold to that, I have no argument.

Don't you also tentatively order the facts as they come in to conform with your world view? Can anyone avoid a naturalistic fallacy?

I: Yes, everyone easily commits a naturalistic fallacy, and I only wish every scientist would admit that.

What is your reaction to the description of man as a machine?

K: I see man as a machine operating in a closed deterministic system that is sufficiently complex to offer him a possibility for change with new experience and a possibility for growth. Ultimately, however, there is a limit on these possibilities. That limit is set by the totality of the organism's environmental and genetic inputs. That a child is able to exhibit more intelligent behavior, more adaptive behavior, as he gets older, doesn't necessarily constitute a problem for the deterministic view. . . . There is room for complex behavioral development and adjustment within the cybernetic type of mechanical man I envision.

I: If you use machine as a metaphor I think it's a very poor metaphor. Here is where I think psychology should possibly be in conversation with the disciplines of English and other humanities to create a better metaphor to describe the nature of man. Machine has a closed system implication. The machine as we know it does not evolve in any way or expand, but man does. There is a great revolt against the technological domination in our society, that man is becoming like a machine: he gets up in the morning, goes to work, comes home. In view of this revolt against the machine and a technologically dominated society, the machine model of man, even if used just as a metaphor, is a highly revolting model.

*A noted behaviorist, B.F. Skinner is the author of *Walden Two* and *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*.



What machine also implies is that man can be controlled like a machine, that if we can control all the complex variables that affect a man we can ultimately predict his behavior like a machine. He's simply an ultra-complex machine with so many more inputs. You said before that it's hard to define autonomous, but I think what that implies is that if you could put man in the hypothetical situation where you know all the environmental and genetic inputs affecting his behavior, and you could control all these inputs, you would still not be able to control his behavior. He could still have one of two possible courses of action, or three, or four, and you could not predict which one he would take.

I: Man is a peculiar creature among all others who is aware. He's aware of his similarity to a machine. This awareness, this consciousness, of his own predicament is unique among all creatures. This is the element I think Skinner is not willing to admit into his psychology — self-awareness. This is what I call an element of spirit or the autonomous element in a man. It's a well-known empirical fact that as man becomes more advanced, he becomes less and less easy to control. The more intelligent a person is, the more difficult the behavior modification becomes. One of the reasons is that the person is aware he is being modified, that he can therefore resist that modification.

Then you say that in man's unique awareness, not present in any machine or lower animal, lies possibly his ability to resist control.

I: Yes. Man has that capacity. As a scientist I cannot make this statement, but as a human being I see man as **Homo religiosus**; man is the religious man. I'm not talking about any particular content of religion here, but I mean that man is capable of ultimate concerns by which he may transcend the naturalistic control.

As a determinist, unwilling to accept the concept of a free will, how do you account for the "mind over matter" behavior of those who practice yoga: the ability to slow down one's heartbeat, respiration, and so forth?

K: You're talking about autonomic conditioning. For years there's been a distinction made in psychology textbooks between voluntary and involuntary muscles. The idea is that skeletal muscles are under voluntary control and can be consciously operated to permit a person to make various kinds of motor movements ranging

from walking to picking up small objects, while the other set of muscles was thought by most until just recently to be under involuntary control. Recent research has shown that it is possible for human subjects to exert voluntary control over these so-called involuntary muscles. It is important to point out here that involuntary muscles are activated by nerves which are, to a greater or lesser degree, influenced by the brain. In other words, there exists a mechanism by which the nervous system can exert control over respiration, heart beat, and blood pressure. To have characterized these muscles as involuntary was simply a mistake.

Obviously, you don't buy the notion of "mind over matter."

K: I can't see the "mind." I can see the body, and that's all I think there is. I don't know anything about the "mind." I think the brain is able to exert control over the so-called involuntary muscles. I don't need to resort to any extraphysical explanation of autonomic conditioning. If there were no nerves making contacts with involuntary muscles, and somehow these muscles could be controlled by intention, then I would have to think about my answer, but there is a mechanism by which this control can be effected.

I: That's where I have a very difficult time accepting any physiological reductionism, that is, the obvious intentionality of man. The human being is an action system; he does things. To reduce this intentionality to a mere physiological phenomenon is very difficult for me to accept.

How do you, not as a scientist, but as a human being, view or interpret your day-to-day living? As a human being I'm sure you have existential concerns about your family, about yourself, about the state of the world.

K: The view of man that I adopt in the laboratory is not the same view that I adopt at home, but it may be someday. I don't consider my relationship with my family in neuro-mechanistic terms, mainly because this type of analysis is at present at a very primitive stage of scientific development and, consequently, offers rather limited insights into the causes of human behavior. What I know about the changes that take place in neurons in the retina when the eye is stimulated doesn't really help me a great deal in understanding why my wife likes a particular dress. But I think eventually that kind of elementary analysis will lead to more complex analyses of, say visual preference behavior, so that someday I should be able to predict my wife's selection before it is made.



One thing that especially worries people about the new scientific psychology is the possibility of Orwell's 1984 or Huxley's Brave New World becoming a reality. The word "control" evokes very negative responses from most people.

K: Control is not necessarily a bad thing. Once man's behavior is analyzed in neurophysiological terms, which I believe will someday happen, it will be possible to correct abnormal psychological behavior simply by correcting the neurophysiology which mediates that behavior. So this knowledge can be used to help people; it can be used toward great social good. On the other it can be very destructive, and in the hands of the wrong people it can enslave man. The double-edged sword aspect of this type of knowledge is present potentially in any scientific study of man. Naturally, there's a certain mental resistance to the idea of control, but we haven't really said enough about the good applications of it.

Will it ever be feasible to control human behavior? Behaviorists are often accused of working in the laboratory rather than in the natural world, and the natural world, if not of a different nature than the lab, is at least so much more complex, especially when you're working with human beings, that the variables might almost be of an infinite number.


K: The feasibility of neuro-behavior control techniques is well established. For example, techniques of electrical and chemical brain stimulation exist today which when applied to various subcortical brain structures of animals can elicit a wide range of highly organized emotional and motivational behaviors, including hypersexuality, rage, food-seeking, water-seeking, and many others. I don't see anything objectionable about working with an animal in a controlled environment as a first step to understanding more complex behavior. I think it's a more efficient way to gather information. Hopefully, as one's experimental methods improve and become more sensitive, one can try to simulate more and more the natural environment and ultimately be able to move out of the laboratory and be able to understand the effects of all these influences on human behavior. I realize it's artificial, but a certain amount of artificiality is necessary, and hopefully the artificiality will become less and less, and the tests situation will become more representative of nature and therefore more powerful.

You talked before about a maturing psychology being able to deal with the full human being. By that do you mean the incorporation of things into science we might now see as extrascientific? We talked before about the spirit, or the soul, or things theology

now deals with. Do you feel these things should be incorporated into the scientific approach?

I: I clearly make a distinction between what is the domain of psychology as a science and what is the domain of the humanities. For example, when I teach in the classroom, I operate within the pretty well prescribed domain of psychology. In this domain, I accept contributions made by various fields of psychology, including a lot of contributions the behaviorists have made. But I do not buy scientific reductionism as a human being, which says all we need to know can be given by science. On the same token, I object just as vehemently to theologians who say that all we need to know can be discovered by theology. My view is that a dialogue of the different disciplines is necessary. The emerging picture of the science of the future may be a little more inclusive. At present, we are going through a phase of almost frightening specialization. But, soon, a phase of integration of bits of specialized knowledge must come. Biology, psychology, sociology may be integrated without losing their own unique contributions. This more organized, integrated approach will hopefully be able to deal more and more with the data we are not capable of dealing with now. Whether this means science will be victorious and the humanities will be gradually swallowed into psychology or whether this means humanistic concerns will gradually take over psychology, it's difficult to say, but my futuristic vision is that of more cooperation, dialogue, integration, so that some of the humanistic concerns we have today will be dealt with by a more adequate psychology.





N2164





Nonsense in Understanding

if air were a cushion
then man wouldn't float
if man were an animal
then sunset would be colorless
if colors would be sunless
then man, were he animal
or not
would be airless.
Then one should excite that
which he writes
hears, thinks, does
feels, sees
until the animal in him
sees the colorless sunset
feels the lung drawn tight from
airlessness
thinks he were floating
and moves into the beyond.

All of which neither of one can
may should would nor wants
to understand.



abortion

decision



I. Controversy and strong debate have accompanied the issue of abortion from ancient time to the present, but the recent decision (January 22, 1973) by the United States Supreme Court* concerning criminal abortion statutes has certainly heightened debate in many areas of the country. The high court was well aware of the depth of disagreement over abortion laws and recognized emotional nature of the issues involved. The legal aspect is but one small part of the problem: changing attitudes, advances in medical expertise, personal philosophies, experiences, morals, religious beliefs, and serious societal considerations such as population growth, pollution, poverty, sexism and racism all have their influence upon the issue of abortion.

In spite of these peripheral issues, the nine justices made it clear from the outset that they were strictly limiting themselves to a resolution of the main issue "by constitutional measurement free of emotion and of predilection." Justice Blackmun, who wrote the majority opinion, further emphasized this stance by quoting from Justice Holmes' dissent in *Lochner v. New York* (1905):

"If the Constitution is made for people of fundamentally differing views, the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel or even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States."

Despite the court's expressed intention to decide only constitutional issues in this case, it did take notice of medical/legal history to help clarify particular attitudes and opinions concerning the abortion procedure. However, statements by opponents of abortion that the Supreme Court expressly legitimized murder of "persons" protected by the Constitution are faulty because the court *simply did not decide* when an embryo or fetus becomes "alive" under the law.

II. This case, *Roe v. Wade*, was based on a claim that Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional due to vagueness and overbreadth. The Texas law was similar to those in most states, forbidding all abortions except those necessary to save the life of the mother. Thus, the plaintiff (appellant) in this case was faced with three choices: 1) no abortion; 2) an illegal abortion; or 3) an expensive, out-of-state abortion, merely because her life apparently was not in danger due to the pregnancy. She contended that her inability to obtain an abortion under safe, clinical condi-

* This article is dealing specifically with *Roe v. Wade*, a Texas case. We are not referring to its companion case from Georgia, *Doe v. Bolton*, which was decided at the same time on slightly different grounds. The results of the two cases were essentially the same, however.



tions by a licensed, competent physician abridged her right of personal privacy under the Bill of Rights (specifically the 1st, 4th, 5th and 9th) and the 14th Amendment.

The right of privacy argument, which is complex, a bit elusive, and rather new in constitutional law, has been used such issues as marital intimacy, contraception, procreation, family relationships, child rearing and education. These areas have been deemed to be legitimate zones of privacy in which state restriction or control must be severely limited; for personal privacy is an implicit, but fundamental, right which the courts have extracted from certain amendments plus a basic concept of personal, ordered liberty.

In this abortion case, the court found that the right of privacy was "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Blackmun further explained the detrimental effects that the state's denial of this choice could have upon a woman, e.g. harmful effects upon her physical and mental health both before and after giving birth, the problems of unwanted children, the stigma of being an unwed mother.

At the same time, however, the majority emphasized that this right of privacy is *not* an absolute right enabling any pregnant woman to obtain an abortion at any time, any place, in any manner or for any reason. In other words, this decision by the Supreme Court did *not* facilitate "abortion on demand" as some critics claim. It simply found that the Texas statute (and those like it) infringed too severely upon a woman's right to an abortion to withstand constitutional scrutiny.

The right of privacy argument is not one-sided, though. The state's interest in restricting certain personal behavior must be balanced against individual rights, a common constitutional test which is applied in nearly all cases dealing with private rights versus state statutory regulations. In that type of controversy, the state must not only show that it has an interest in establishing certain restrictions, but that that interest is "compelling." A strict definition of a "compelling state interest" is nearly as elusive as a definition of the right of privacy. In determining the legislative history and intent behind the Texas abortion statute in order to understand the nature of that state's interest in restricting abortions, the court found three commonly advanced reasons for the enactment of criminal abortion statutes:

First, Blackmun explored the rationale that these laws were "the product of a Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct." No one, including the representatives of the state of Texas, took this argument as a serious justification for existing laws. The parties agreed as well that if this rationale had been the state's sole purpose for the statute, the law would have been overbroad.

Second, abortion was discussed as a strictly medical procedure. Before the development and general acceptance of antiseptics, abortion mortality was high. Thus, it was argued that a state's concern in enacting anti-abortion statutes was to protect the pregnant woman from an operation that often proved to be fatal.

The court acknowledged, however, that modern medical techniques and safeguards have now made the abortion





procedure relatively risk-free. Blackmun quoted statistical data to show that:

“mortality rates for women undergoing early abortions. . . appear to be as low as or lower than the rates for normal childbirth.”

The state *does* maintain a legitimate interest in the area of abortion in that, as any other medical procedure, it must meet high health, surgical, professional and post-operative care standards. The prevalence of death and disease in so-called abortion mills strengthens rather than weakens this state interest in proper care — especially when abortion is proposed at a late state of pregnancy.

The third possible reason for a state's interest in abortion restriction is concerning prenatal life. Some persons argue that this interest is justified by the presence of human life in the fetus from the moment of conception. The court, however, recognized that “a legitimate state interest in this area need not stand or fall on acceptance of the belief that life begins at conception or at some other point prior to live birth.” It merely found that the state may assert interest beyond the protection of the woman alone so long as at least *potential life* is involved.

Whether or not these state interests, which can become “dominant,” are at the same time “compelling” enough to override personal rights guaranteed by the Constitution is an entirely different question from that of their existence. Briefly, the court found that the interests proposed by the state of Texas were not strong enough to overcome the rights of the plaintiff/appellant. Again quoting from the decision: “In view of all this, we do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake.” Blackmun repeated, however, that the state does have legitimate and important interests in protecting the health of the mother *and* any “potentiality of human life” — and that these interests are separate and distinct, growing individually as pregnancy progresses.

The practical effect of the court's trimester holding is that 1) a woman and her doctor may decide to terminate her pregnancy up until the end of approximately three months, essentially without restrictions; 2) between approximately the third and sixth months, the state may place reasonable restrictions on the abortion procedure in an effort to promote the health of the mother, and 3) after “viability”, or approximately the sixth month of pregnancy, a state may strictly regulate or even ban abortions except as a life-or-health-saving process for the mother. Also, the state may proscribe abortions not done by a licensed physician. Thus, the Texas anti-abortion statute and those like it were declared unconstitutional in that they effectually proscribed abortions.

The abortion issue has a profound effect on people because it deals with relatively basic life theories. Although individuals must adopt a theory of the beginning of human life in making such decisions, the court carefully tried to avoid this issue.

From a historical standpoint, one can find nothing but disagreement as to when life begins. Restrictive criminal abortion laws in this country are of surprisingly recent vintage; yet the controversy raged as long ago as the time of the Persian Empire. According to historical data set



forth in *Roe v. Wade*, both Greek and Roman law dealt with the issue of abortion and basically afforded little protection to the unborn. Ancient religion, as well, did not seem to forbid abortion.

The Hippocratic Oath* and its obviously negative approach toward abortion was also analyzed by the court in *Roe*. An analysis of the problem by Dr. Edelstein (*The Hippocratic Oath*, 1943), as quoted in the beginning of the opinion reveals the following:

The Oath was not uncontested even in Hippocrates day; only the Pythagorean school of philosophers frowned upon the related act of suicide. Most Greek thinkers, on the other hand, commended abortion, at least prior to viability. See Plato, *Republic*, V. 461; Aristotle, *Politics*, VII. 1335 b 25. For the Pythagoreans, however, it was a matter of dogma. For them the embryo was animate from the moment of conception, and abortion meant the destruction of a living being.

Edelstein concludes that the anti-abortion sentiments within the Oath represent the views of a small, rigid segment of Greek opinion, and certainly were not universally accepted. With the emergence of Christianity, however, agreement with Pythagorean concepts concerning suicide and abortion became more widespread and accepted. Thus, Dr. Edelstein suggests that the Oath is "a Pythagorean manifesto and not the expression of a absolute standard of medical conduct."

Justice Blackmun also presented a short historical analysis of common law developments concerning abortion, (plus the positions of English statutory law, American law, the American Medical Association, the American Public Health Association, and the American Bar Association which probably give us as clear a picture of the intermingling of legal and moral stances on abortion as any more recent developments, (plus the positions of English statutory law, American law, the American Medical Association, the American Public Health Association, and the American Bar Association.)

Early common law theories seemed to center around the concept of the "quickening" — the first recognizable movement of the fetus *in utero*, usually occurring between the 16th and 18th weeks of pregnancy. An abortion *before* quickening was *not* considered an offense under early common law. This position was strongly influenced by theological concepts of when life begins. Most canon law determined that an embryo or fetus became a "person" when it was infused with a "soul", or "animated." Christian theology eventually fixed the point of animation at 40 days for a male and 80 days for a female.

*Depending upon the particular translation, the relevant section is: "I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this effect. Similarly, I will not give to a woman an abortive remedy."



Yet, disagreement continued — and due to various influences, the time of quickening (about 24 to 28 weeks) ultimately became that point in common law *after which* abortion was considered to be a criminal act. Prior to quickening, the fetus was considered to be part of the mother and thus incapable of being illegally destroyed. This theory followed the common law throughout England and came to be accepted in America. Not until after the Civil War did state legislation begin to replace the common law; and even with legislation, most states retained a more lenient stance toward abortions than today. By the end of the 19th century, Victorian influences increased the degree of punishment for nearly every type of abortion procedure.

Thus, considering this history and other information, the Supreme Court stated that it would not resolve the difficult issue of when life begins. Justice Blackmun wrote, "When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer."

The court clearly found that an unborn fetus is not a "person" under the meaning of the 14th Amendment and consequently not protected as such. To date, there is no case law in our country holding contrary to the Supreme Court's statement.

This is not to say, however, that in American law the fetus has never appeared to hold rights of its own. In most states, recovery of damages for prenatal injuries is permissible under tort law (civil as opposed to criminal "wrongs") if the fetus was viable at the time of the injury. For example, if a pregnant mother is struck by an automobile and the fetus she is carrying dies, the parents can sue under wrongful death statutes to recover a money award for the death. Blackmun dismissed this seeming inconsistency in the law by stating that this type of tort action appears to be aimed at vindicating the rights of the *parents*, and that the fetus represents, at most, only "the potentiality of life."

Similar instances occur in property law as well — e.g., an unborn child, represented by a guardian *ad litem*, can acquire property rights or interests through inheritance or other such means. Perfection of these rights, however, is generally contingent upon live birth, thus leading the court to the conclusion in this case that "the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense."

Many abortion opponants believe that this case has set a dangerous precedent for a parade of horrors as yet unparalleled in our country. Their contention is that the Supreme Court has legitimized the taking of human life and will thus be capable of "legalizing" genocide, infanticide, euthanasia, etc. *ad infinitum*.


We respectfully disagree with these arguments, and further contend that the court's decision in *Roe* was far from "sweeping", but indeed quite modest. It did *not* adopt a stance favoring "abortion on demand;" it did *not* label abortions as "good" in a moral sense, but dealt strictly with constitutional issues presented to it making






necessary, if controversial, distinctions; it *did* recognize *both* individual and state interests in the abortion procedure and merely enabled women in early stages of pregnancy to choose whether or not to terminate that pregnancy. This decision was hardly a mandate encouraging abortion; neither did it legitimize any unwarranted taking of human life.


Politically, the Burger Court is not known for its liberalism. Quite the reverse has been true, as a matter of fact. Thus, the fears that this Supreme Court will begin to systematically encourage immoral behavior are simply unfounded.



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real thing.
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COLORED GRAY

Lying toward dead center, and yet not exactly
Especially in summer
When children's laughing voices
Fade like the setting sun into fall.

Happiness is rough — sadness smooth. . .
Somewhere in between is fate
Quite decided; but uncertain
Especially in war
When men's suffering voices
Fall no longer to be heard.

Tears are expressions — smiles are too
Somewhere in between, at ease
Our destiny: perfectly calm; yet upsetting
Especially to a baby
Alive and cheerful babies
Try to find a meaning in it.

Knowledge is expensive — ignorance cheap
Somewhere. . . costing only time, is fate
Completely plausible and yet uncertain
Capable of growth, development, and maturity
Conceivably evil, destructive and gross.
Ahead of us is greatness?

Boastfulness is yellow — humbleness is blue
Somewhere in between are we
Decidedly convinced and yet uncertain
Wisdom comes with years
And years bring rain, snow, sunshine. . .
Of what can we be certain?

Birth is shiny — death is dull. . . somewhere in between is life
Colored pain and joy and always uncertain
especially in a graveyard
Where from one tombstone to the next
Is not only a lifetime, but eternity.
Man perseveres through time
and yet he is still uncertain
only to know. . .

Love is hard and hate is soft. . . somewhere in between is fate
Colored gray and uncertain
Especially in winter.

Gideon Ferebee, Jr.

Love is hard and hate is soft. . . somewhere in between is fate
Colored gray and uncertain.
Especially in winter
When melting waters flood into spring.

Want is high and need is low. . . somewhere in between is fate
Without a height or depth and uncertain
Especially in spring
When multi-colored trees turn green
And summer comes upon a windy cloud.

Right is right and wrong is left. . .
Somewhere in between is fate



spelling

"Light!"

lightnightbright
sun on lashes. sundancing
through in glass. sundancing
in hair. red green blue gold.
warmthdancing sundancing
singaround in me. to catchit holdit
a net of butterfly
collors shimmering
of sun
of moon
of night
to catchit holdit to keep
warmth caught in passing moment
FOREVER
sheer clear


delight
light
right

dancing to sing
enticing dazing magicing light
calling feet to dance mind
to fly
in shy away
and die

"I CAN'T"

"Stop daydreaming and sit down. You're out. I'm really ashamed
of you, a third grader unable to spell 'light'! Next person. Please
spell 'light.'"

Joan Caroon



what is a

IN THE DECEMBER issue, John Strietelmeier inaugurated a *Lighter*-sponsored series on the "Christian university" by plumping down that "it is probably too late to talk about 'the Christian university' either as a present reality or as a viable alternative for the future." That is a hard act to follow, especially if you found his arguments persuasive! (There referred to the policies of government as well as to dispositions of the "larger society," church constituencies, and university members themselves.) This member found them unexceptionable — and found himself no exception.

When someone says it is too late to talk about the Christian university and goes on talking for four columns, he is either garrulous or nervous — or prophetic. But Strietelmeier is neither A nor B; therefore, we must consider C. Prophets do not limit themselves to what is possible; they tell us we may very well go to hell with what now seems possible. They demand an "art of the impossible." Similarly, Strietelmeier went on to utter five oracles, all of them characteristically paradoxical.

1. Christians at the university will continue to draw at Word and Supper — in chapel (whether or not campus life still "revolves" around it) and elsewhere — for failure to do so is a "failure of nerve." (Old words as the basis of new judgments.)
2. They will think of themselves as "servants" in some extra-ordinary sense. (Non-servile servants.)
3. They will "care" for one another in "apostolic" ways. ("Apostolic care" is like stroking one another with sandpaper.)
4. They will seek an institutional excellence not set or standardized by other comparable institutions — "outliving, outthinking, outdying" them. (They will "excel" even where few choose to compete.)
5. They will respect individual vocation, which means the right to define vocations. (Callings may call away from standardized functions.)

During the Middle Ages, when the term "Christian university" was born, every aspiring member cut his eye teeth by probing the sentences of Peter Lombard. Following is a commentary, in the day of the post-Christian university, on the sentences of Strietelmeier.

METHOD

Our procedure recommends itself by reference to classical as well as Christian traditions. When Cicero Sr. packed off Marcus Tullius Jr. to college in Athens, he pointed the young man to some advance reading in the Stoics. This advice seems passing strange, seeing that Cicero was not himself fond of the Stoics, whom he regarded as dogmatic, impractical, and comparatively uninventive. A first explanation must be rejected: the old man was *not* pointing his son toward something safe and unsketchy, which wouldn't do him any harm.

What Cicero knew, on the basis of his own long practice, is that strange utterances are likely to bear uncustomary truths and that propositions which seem most strange are therefore likely to prove most productive. All knowledge begins in ambiguity and proceeds toward clarity. To deal only with clarities even to expand them, is not really to learn anything new at all. (This truism Heidegger repeated in his aphorism that "science does not think") Truth recovered from old and strange sources may prove most revealing and motivating; it can result, using Cicero's phrase, in *fides et motus*.

This had been a favorite method of the Greeks, whose theoriz

Christian

ing may be shown to derive from the fables and genealogies of Hesiod and Homer. It became a method of the early moderns — think of Francis Bacon first resisting, then puzzling, and finally wondering over the fact that genuine innovation depends upon tradition. It has reappeared as a mode of revolutionary discussion today as protagonists cite perplexing yet pithy utterances of Eric Hoffer or Malcolm X. But it has been practiced most eminently by Christians in every age, who customarily begin by citing ancient scriptures.

Our method suggests itself in a time when extension of ordinary plausibilities points toward destruction.

PACKED WORDS,

UNSERVILE SERVANTS, ABRASIVE CARING

1. In his first sentence, Strietelmeier asserts that a modern Christian community will continue to explore old scriptural words, and to perform old acts with water, bread and wine, even in this very different day. It will do so not, because these things appear plausible but because they do not — for that very reason fresh light may break from them. At this university theologians do not take it as their task to find sources continuities, to show how wise were old words and deeds by new standards. These are able to make us wise, if at all, only in unexpected ways. "Faith begins in delight and ends in doctrine," said the late Ian Ramsey. The word "ends" seems ominous and well-chosen.

The Princeton University Catalogue announces that attendance in chapel is "part of any rounded education, helping to produce rounded men." We are speaking of words and ceremonies which are not rounded nor readily fitted in, which help produce strangers or pilgrims.

We point explicitly to the dislocations produced by old words in new settings: "separation" in a time of integration, "discrimination" along side of non-discrimination, "Blessed are the poor" along side a war on poverty. We even sing or crow weird words: in a time of executive take-over, "Trust not in princes, they are but mo-or-tal"; in a time of air pollution, "while I draw this fleeting breath." Put that beside Professor Krekeler's course in Ecology and you might *get* both *fides* and *motus*.

2. That becomes the key for squeezing everything "servile" out of the Christian "servant". The focus is no longer on felt needs but on those uncovered by faithful, corporate reflection. Alma Mater may be a servant but she must not become a whore. Recall how the prophets objected to a Servant Israel who painted up for every new king that marched through the land, lying down under every green tree and against every stone so as not to be passed by. Jeremiah used a very old joke: the difference between the pleasure and the pain is nine months — one academic year.


3. The same strange content qualifies sentence 3 on "caring". "Apostolic" caring, as Strietelmeier terms it, is pastoral of course. But it does not merely follow along behind the sheep or pick up after them; it also kicks the rumps of the sheep. It does not merely hold hands; it prods. It requires looking in two directions: first backwards to prophets and crosses, and then outward with a fresh intention: what we must say and do now is like *that*. Members of the university who share a Christian memory care enough to ask no less of one another.

UNIVERSITY AND VOCATION

4. A Hippocratic aphorism, dated about 400 B.C., gave voice to a complaint which has recurred in the modern university: The art is getting longer and longer, The brain of students not bigger and bigger.



University?



The Greeks found a remedy in arts of inquiry which enabled a student to shape questions, form judgments, and pursue relevant and valued facts. During the Middle Ages those disciplines became formulated as "liberal arts" which preceded professional training in architecture, medicine, law, or theology. Because these "arts" came to seem wordy and impractical, educators in the Renaissance shifted the meaning of "liberal arts" to that of subject matter fields and divided those according to historical periods. A proliferation of subject matters ensued; graduate students thought of themselves as "adding to the sum of knowledge" in their fields, and then transmitted to undergraduate the research methodologies which would enable them to do so. Meanwhile, new capacities for information storage made possible an accumulation of facts whose value depended on *not* reshaping questions. The result is a "knowledge explosion" entailing for most of us what the logician Jan Lukasiewicz calls "the ignorance explosion."

There have been attempts to overcome modern "fragmentation" in the university through programs of general education, usually construed in terms of "distribution requirements," or through inter-disciplinary offerings in which representatives of various departments report work in progress within their fields. But the modern university has never recovered a "unity" in the sense that all participants discuss the basic formulation of problems under consideration, nor a "diversity" in the sense that underlying assumptions are regularly exposed to criticism and revision. What has become lost is not only the conception of a "Christian university" but also any common academic procedure like that which gave substance to the term "university."

The "scholastic method" is remembered as restrictive and burdensome; yet that procedure made possible the airing of many tentative and speculative issues within the university — which were not considered dangerous so long as they were submitted to the rigors of disciplined debate. It facilitated discussions leading to revisions of inquiry and focus, not merely of logistical arrangements, within the university. Therefore progress seemed possible, as John of Salisbury put it, if descendants learned to stand on the shoulders and not in the faces of their predecessors.

Any modern university must resist pressures toward unity through imposed conformity. But may it not also resist the modern trend toward increased proliferation accompanied by a pervasive, uncontested uniformity? A new question of institutional vocation is upon us today, as Strietelmeier suggests, and that question will not be settled by aping glances toward prestigious institutions. "The new academic depression" has brought a previous mode of expansion into question. An issue confronting every university is whether it will ask afresh what education should be like in the next decade. That requires something more than predicting future trends in the hope of grabbing new markets while they last. It is rather a matter of deciding which cards to play in helping people shape their future.

Some old cards remain in the hands of any modern university which remembers the tradition of the "Christian university." To play those cards against the current stream would mean resisting a further proliferation of subject fields on campus, as well as further training in standardized skills that can be left perhaps, to societal institutions that employ them. It would imply, rather, clarifying and developing those disciplines which should characterize every man, which help to shape and reshape every subject matter, and which underlie every special skill. That would require a development of arts of inquiry which uncover problems for which present research methodologies may not be tailor made. Playing these cards would not in itself make an institution of higher learning a "Christian university," but some Christian guts might help a university to do so. This gives su

stance to Strietelmeier's call for a personal and institutional excellence that does not pander after short-term futures or prestigious peers.

5. The final sentence points to the integrity of vocations within the university and, accordingly, outside it. This sentence carries little weight if performance in either sphere is simply predetermined. The University seems less able today than formerly to promise its candidates an open sesame to waiting jobs (dubious and socially divisive benefit in the past). But might it not, by reasserting authority in its own vocations, help young people become reformers of old jobs and formers of new functions when they leave? Recent attention to para-medical, paralegal, and para-clergy functions seems a move in this direction. A renewed sense of vocation may well include a sense of being "called out" from previously assumed functions.

Educare means "to lead out" not "to fit in." "Truth" is a richer commodity than the store of facts presently multiplying in information systems. It becomes a matter of shaping basic questions which turn attention toward new sorts of facts and connections among facts, toward innovations in research, and toward creativity with respect to theoretical and social structures. Pursuit of such truth is a high calling, in which the university may play a basic role. But the vocation of its students extends even further. Truth is a rare commodity, but the supply usually exceeds the demand.

WORDJERKER!

Wordjerker! Muse! Shoot up
this stale mind! Crusty cracks
lack a little water (if you've nothing
stronger) for a magnificent
elaborate catchy
well-rounded
crop of mold
because there are no flowers left
to pick in the sun-spangled
world of worlds, and everything
is a parasite of that
poor cannibal brain .
(why shouldn't we share each other's infection?)

Joan Lundgren

